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I. INTRODUCTIONIN 2010, THE TRANSPORTATION Security Administration
(TSA) implemented Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) as
the primary screening technology at airport security check-
points across the United States. A massive public backlash fol-
lowed due to the perceived privacy violations associated with
* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2013. The
author would like to thank Professor Eric T. Jensen for his valuable guidance and
insight on this article. Cory S. Clements also provided more assistance than any
friend could hope for-the author is truly grateful.
1 See Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-in-
formation/advanced-imaging-technology-ait (last updated July 23, 2013).
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AIT scanners.2 For example, some feared that the use of body
scanners would result in online "naked images" of the traveling
public.3 Security experts disputed the security improvements of-
fered by the scanners.' A nationwide "opt-out" protest on the
day before Thanksgiving 2010 threatened to significantly slow
down travel times due to travelers opting for pat-downs instead
of body scans.' The discomfort that some passengers felt about
enhanced pat-downs6 became infamous when one traveler
warned a TSA screener, "If you touch my junk, I'll have you
arrested."7
The issue of the legality of body scanners eventually made its
way through the courts and was reviewed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit). The Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center, along with several other
named plaintiffs, brought a complaint against the TSA for viola-
tions of multiple statutes, as well as the Fourth Amendment, in
2 But cf Marc Ambinder, White House Fights Pat-Down Backlash, NAT'L J. (Nov.
22, 2010), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/white-house-fights-pat-
down-backlash-20101122 ("[The White House] also disputed the very notion of a
public backlash.").
3 Joel Johnson, One Hundred Naked Citizens: One Hundred Leaked Body Scans,
GIZMODO (Nov. 16, 2010), http://gizmodo.com/5690749/these-are-the-first-100-
leaked-body-scans (revealing that 100 scans from a Florida courthouse were re-
leased in response to a Freedom of Information Act request).
4 Bruce Schneier, A Waste of Money and Time, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/22/do-body-scanners-make-us-
safer/a-waste-of-money-and-time.
- See Say "I Opt Out" of Naked-Body Scanners on National Opt Out Day, November 24,
WE WON'T FLY, http://wewontfly.com/opt-out-day/ (last visited April 24, 2013).
Note that many airports simply used magnetometers instead of body scanners to
prevent protest-caused delays. E.g., Newark Airport Controversial Scanners Are Barely
Used on Busiest Travel Day, N.J. STAR LEDGER (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2010/11 /newark_1iberty-airportcontrov.html ("The majority of
Newark's full-body scanners were idle throughout much of the day, depriving
most passengers of the chance to opt out of the controversial screening proce-
dure even if they had wanted to.").
6 Jeffrey Goldberg, For the First Time, the TSA Meets Resistance, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29,
2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/10/for-the-first-time-
the-tsa-meets-resistance/65390/ (describing "[a] journey through the security
line at the Baltimore airport").
7 Matthew Kaminski, In Defense of Scanners and Pat-Downs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575652651
928049266.html; see also Man to Security: Don't "Touch MyJunk", YouTUBE (Nov. 15,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R24DyuoZLaM; Charles Krautham-
mer, Don't Touch My junk, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/18/AR2010111804494.html.
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connection with the TSA's rollout of AIT devices.8 This article
critiques the D.C. Circuit's short opinion. The court held that
while the TSA had failed to properly engage in notice-and-com-
ment proceedings before implementing AIT scanners, the use
of AIT scanners did not violate the other claimed statutes or the
Constitution.'
The D.C. Circuit's analysis of the statutory and constitutional
issues surrounding AIT scanners was too abbreviated and based
on overly attenuated case law or simply faulty logic. This article
does not argue whether the court came to the correct conclu-
sion, but instead examines the court's flawed analysis. The D.C.
Circuit's ruling in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (EPIC) 10 was so flawed that no fu-
ture court should rely on it as precedent-especially as an issue
of first impression.
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has never considered the question of
body scanners at airport security checkpoints. It has, however,
ruled on several privacy-related cases in the past few terms. Most
of these cases have generally been favorable to privacy advo-
cates, even if that privacy comes at the expense of the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining safety or public order. 1
Several other circuits have considered various post-September
11, 2001 (9/11) airport security measures, such as requiring
identification at security,12 x-raying carry-on baggage,' 3 and con-
8 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 2-3 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
9 Id. at 8-11.
10 Id. at 1.
11 See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects persons against a rule that always allows warrantless blood
draws in DUI cases); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects against police using a drug-sniffing dog in the curti-
lage of a home without a warrant); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against the police using a GPS
vehicular tracking device without a warrant); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against police use of a
thermal-imager on a home without a warrant). Other circuits have similarly up-
held Fourth Amendment privacy claims, even in the face of compelling govern-
ment interests. E.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment prevents a border patrol agent from inves-
tigating a computer's files without a warrant).
12 See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006).
13 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007).
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ducting increasingly invasive searches of individuals who failed a
less invasive search." The D.C. Circuit in EPIC relied on several
cases when analyzing airport security searches using the admin-
istrative-search exception.15 To assist in analyzing the court's
reading of those cases, this article briefly summarizes those cases
below.
A. CIrY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND
The D.C. Circuit relied on City of Indianapolis v. Edmond" for
the proposition that the "need to search airline passengers 'to
ensure public safety can be particularly acute.' "" In Edmond, the
Supreme Court held that city police drug-interdiction check-
points violated the Fourth Amendment.18 The Court explained
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that searches and
seizures be reasonable."'" The Court also noted that it has "al-
lowed searches for certain administrative purposes without par-
ticularized suspicion of misconduct, provided that those
searches are appropriately limited."2 0 But generally speaking,
the Court has "never approved a checkpoint program whose pri-
mary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."2 1
Instead, the Court has only approved of checkpoint programs
that are "designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to
the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring
roadway safety." 2 2 In determining the constitutionality of a par-
ticular program, the Court scrutinizes the type of public interest
that the program is meant to serve.2 ' Furthermore, "the gravity
of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concern-
ing what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue
a given purpose. "24
Of particular interest to courts analyzing airport security
searches after Edmond is the Court's note that its holding-that
14 See id. at 962.
15 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8-11.
16 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
17 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48).
18 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
19 Id. at 37.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 41.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 43 (stating that the Court "must look more closely at the nature of the
public interests that such a regime is designed principally to serve").
24 Id. at 42.
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certain drug checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment-
"does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at
places like airports . . . where the need for such measures to
ensure public safety can be particularly acute."2
B. UNITED STATES v. HARTWELL
The plaintiffs in EPIC cited United States v. HartwelJ 6 as persua-
sive precedent for how the court ought to analyze an airport
search using the administrative-search exception. In Hartwell,
the Third Circuit held that the search of a defendant at an air-
port checkpoint was justified under the administrative-search
doctrine. Christian Hartwell set off a metal detector at the
Philadelphia International Airport in May 2003.29 A TSA agent
then used a magnetic wand to perform a more pointed scan of
Mr. Hartwell's person.30 After detecting something in Hartwell's
pocket, the agent discovered that Hartwell's pocket contained
drugs, and Hartwell was arrested.
Applying the test for administrative searches established by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas,32 the Third Circuit held
that the TSA agent's search of Hartwell was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.33 "Suspicionless checkpoint searches
are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a court
finds a favorable balance between 'the gravity of the public con-
cerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure ad-
vances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty.' "3
To meet the first Brown factor, the court noted that "there can
be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of
paramount importance."" Undoubtedly, there is voluminous ev-
25 Id. at 47-48.
26 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006). Hartwell was authored by current Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Alito before his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court.
27 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10-11
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
28 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 177.
29 Id. at 175.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 176.
32 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The three factors established in Brown include (1) "a
weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure"; (2) "the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest"; and (3) "the severity of
the interference with individual liberty." Id. at 50-51.
33 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 177.
34 Id. at 178-79 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004)).
3 Id. at 179.
2013] 715
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
idence and support for the government's actions taken to en-
sure safe air travel.3 6
With respect to the second factor, the court held that Brown
requires that airport checkpoints "advance the public inter-
est."3 7 The court pointed out that a pre-boarding search is the
only effective way to detect airline passengers who "'are reasona-
bly likely to hijack an airplane."' 38 And because there is no way
to know which passengers are potential hijackers, it follows that
all passengers must be searched.3 9 But the court was also careful
to say that screening procedures "'have every indicia of being
the most efficacious that could be used"' and that "airport
checkpoints have been effective."4 0
The court held that "the procedures involved in Hartwell's
search were minimally intrusive, . . . well-tailored to protect per-
sonal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of
screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing
search," and therefore met the third Brown factor." Further-
more, the first several searches "involved no physical touch-
ing"-they were instead "less intrusive substitute [s] for a
physical pat-down. "42
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
The events on 9/11 changed the face of air travel forever.
Multiple armed terrorists hijacked several airplanes and used
them as missiles to attack the World Trade Center in New York,
New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.4 3 Another hi-
jacked plane crashed in Pennsylvania.4 1 In response, America in-
36 See id.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 180 (quoting Singleton v. Comm'r, 606 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1979)).
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973)).
41 Id. Note that the court included a footnote pointing out that it was not
"set[ting] the outer limits of intrusiveness in the airport context," nor was it
"devis[irig] any bright-line test to implement the Brown standard in all future
cases." Id. at n.10. It was merely "hold [ing] that Hartwell's search was 'minimally
intrusive' under Brown." Id.; see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
42 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180.
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itiated wars on multiple fronts, eventually finding and killing
most of those responsible for planning the attacks.15
The 9/11 attacks also fundamentally changed the experience
of air travel generally and airport security specifically. Congress
created the TSA in response to the 9/11 attacks; the TSA even-
tually became part of the new Department of Homeland Secur-
ity. 6 Since 2001, the TSA has continuously implemented new
security measures in response to different terrorist plots discov-
ered by intelligence sources.4 7 For example, the TSA purchased
and began using body scanners at airports nationwide in re-
sponse to "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's
attempt to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear
while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam
to Detroit, Michigan."
In 2007, the TSA began testing AIT to enable detection of
explosives and other non-metal threats to aviation security.4 9
Two types of technology have been developed and used in air-
ports: "millimeter wave and backscatter. Millimeter wave tech-
nology bounces electromagnetic waves off the body to create a
black and white three-dimensional image. Backscatter technol-
ogy projects low level X-ray beams over the body to create a re-
flection of the body displayed on the monitor."5 0
45 Katrina vanden Heuvel, With Osama bin Laden Dead, It's Time to End the "War
on Terror", NATION (May 2, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/160310/
osama-bin-laden-dead-its-time-end-war-terror.
46 9/11 and TSA, supra note 43.
47 Richard Reid-the "shoe bomber"-led to travelers having to remove their
shoes. Pam Belluck & Kenneth Chang, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation: Shoes
Were a "Homemade Bomb, " FBI. Agent Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2001), http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/12/29/us/a-nation-challenged-the-investigation-shoes-
were-a-homemade-bomb-fbi-agent-says.html. A plot to use liquid explosives to
blow up flights from Britain to America led to banning liquids completely; this
rule was later changed to permit liquids in restricted amounts. Alan Cowell &
Dexter Filkins, Terror Plot Foiled; Airports Quickly Clamp Down, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/world/europe/11plot.html. Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab-the "underwear bomber"-led to body scanners. Joe
Sharkey, Annoyances Mount over the Body Scanner, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2010), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/business/20road.html.
- Kenneth Chang, Explosive on Flight 253 Is Among Most Poweyful, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 27, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/us/28explosives.html.
49 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG No. 12-06,
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The TSA responded to Abdulmutallab's 2009 bombing at-
tempt, as mentioned above, by beginning to use body scanners
as the primary screening method at airport security checkpoints
nationwide.5 1 TSA policy mandates that after a passenger has
passed through the scanner and has been cleared, the image is
deleted. 2 The TSA screener can neither save the image nor
bring a camera or cell phone into the image-viewing room.
Travelers are not required to submit to a body scan, but if
they "opt-out," they are required to receive an "enhanced pat-
down"-a pat-down that was changed in tandem with the body
scanner rollout to implement stricter security protocols, includ-
ing touching sensitive areas. 4
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform
Act,5 5 which, among other things, requires the use of Auto-
mated Target Recognition technology-which uses a generic
passenger image and automatically identifies any areas for addi-
tional screening 56-for all passenger screening beginning June
1, 2012.5 The TSA announced in January 2013 that it would
remove all remaining backscatter-imaging scanners from air-
ports by June 1, 2013, but leave in place millimeter-wave scan-
ners using Automated Target Recognition software.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2009, more than thirty organizations-one of which was
plaintiff EPIC-wrote to the Secretary of Homeland Security,
objecting to the TSA's use of body scanners as the primary
screening method at U.S. airports.5 ' They requested that the
51 Id.
52 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
53 Id. Note that there is only an image-viewing room for backscatter-imaging
scanners because these machines use actual passenger images instead of generic
passenger outlines to identify passengers that need additional screening.
54 Id. at 3.
5 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 826, 126
Stat. 11, 132-33 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(1)).
56 Automated Target Recognition technology removes the need for a TSA em-
ployee to sit in a separate room because scan results do not display passenger-
specific images; they only show a generic outline with potential problem areas
marked. TSA PENETRATION TESTING, supra note 49.
57 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 826.
58 Ron Nixon, Unpopular Full-Body Scanners to Be Removed from Airports, N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/us/tsa-to-remove-
invasive-body-scanners.html.
- Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 4.
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TSA stop using body scanners and engage in a "90-day formal
public rulemaking process."60 The TSA ignored this request for
formal rulemaking, but it did respond with a letter addressing
the organizations' substantive concerns."
In 2010, EPIC and another group sent a second letter request-
ing "the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule" about body
scanners. 2 They claimed that the use of body scanners violates
the Privacy Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the
Fourth Amendment, and that the TSA needed to prepare a pri-
vacy impact assessment before issuing the new rule mandating
the use of body scanners as the primary screening technology."
The TSA responded by taking the position that it is not required
to initiate rulemaking to change screening procedures. In July
2010, two individuals joined EPIC in petitioning the D.C. Circuit
for review."
The D.C. Circuit held that the TSA had no justification for its
failure to conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking. 66 The
court remanded to the agency for further proceedings but did
not vacate the rule-i.e., it did not disallow the use of body scan-
ners-"[b]ecause vacating the present rule would severely dis-
rupt an essential security operation . . . and the rule is . . .
otherwise lawful."" The court then proceeded to dismiss all the
substantive claims-both statutory and constitutional-against
the use of body scanners."
IV. ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
This article does not address whether the D.C. Circuit came to
the right conclusion with regard to the legality-under federal
statutes or the Fourth Amendment-of the TSA's use of body







66 Id. at 8.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 8-11.
69 Id. at 2-3. There are many other scholarly articles that argue the merits of
whether as a statutory or constitutional issue AIT devices should be allowed as
primary screening technology in U.S. airports. See Jennifer S. Ellison & Marc
7192013]
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analyzes the D.C. Circuit's flawed opinion in EPIC and argues
that the D.C. Circuit's reasoning is so flawed that it should not
be used as precedent in other judicial decisions.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar's statement regarding the Su-
preme Court has equal import when applied to a circuit court:
"[E]ven when the modern Court has reached sound results, it
has often given suspect reasons." 0 Such is the case here. The
D.C. Circuit failed to adequately address the legal questions sur-
rounding the plaintiffs' claims. This failure to "say what the law
s"71 is particularly troubling given the fact that this case was the
first-and only-time that an appellate court has considered
many of the questions surrounding the TSA's nationwide use of
body scanners.
The plaintiffs' substantive claims against the use of body scan-
ners included four statutory claims and a Fourth Amendment
claim.73 The D.C. Circuit's shortcomings in adequately resolving
the legal questions raised by each alleged violation are treated in
turn.
B. VIDEO VOYEURISM PREVENTION ACT
The first statutory claim against the use of AIT scanners as the
primary screening technology was that AIT screening violates
the Video Voyeurism Protection Act." The Video Voyeurism
Protection Act was passed in 2004 to combat the threat of tech-
nology "to the privacy of unsuspecting adults" and especially to
Pilcher, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Deployment: Legal Challenges and Re-
sponses, 24 AIR & SPACE LAw. 4 (2012) (arguing that AIT scanners pose no prob-
lem); Brittany R. Stancombe, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship
Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners" and "Pat-Downs", 42 CuMB.
L. REV. 181 (2012) (arguing that AIT scanners violate the Fourth Amendment).
70 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV.
26, 75 (2000).
71 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
72 Notably, the Supreme Court has never taken up the issue. SeeJeffrey Rosen,
"Don't Touch My Junk" Sneaks into the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/plank/ 109463/dont-touch-myjunk-sneaks-
the-supreme-court.
73 The statutory claims against the use of AIT scanners as primary screening
technology included claims under the Video Voyeurism Protection Act, under
the Privacy Act, that the Department of Homeland Security's Chief Privacy Of-
ficer failed to discharge her statutory duties with regard to technology and pri-
vacy protections, and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
74 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
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offer "protections for individuals who may be photographed in
compromising positions in public places."7
The TSA made two arguments in response to the claim. First,
it argued that the plaintiffs could not rightly bring the claim
"because it was not raised before the agency."7 6 But, the plain-
tiffs argued, there was no TSA proceeding in which they could
have even raised the argument." The court did not comment
on this argument other than to correctly point out that the "ab-
sence of [a TSA proceeding] is the very matter at issue here."7 8
The TSA's second argument was that in any case, the Video
Voyeurism Protection Act provides an exception-Section
1801 (c)-for "any lawful law enforcement, correctional, or intel-
ligence activity," which means that TSA screeners cannot be lia-
ble under Section 1801." The plaintiffs argued both that the
alleged Fourth Amendment violation meant that the scans were
not lawful activity and that "the TSA does not engage in 'law
enforcement, correctional, or intelligence activity. '"80 Because
the court rejected the Fourth Amendment claim,"1 it ignored
the plaintiffs' unlawful activity argument. The court also dis-
missed the law enforcement argument with a laugh, only saying
that it "borders upon the silly."8 2
In fact, Section 1801 does not provide a definition for any of
the terms used in Section 1801 (c).8 There is no precedent in
case law for applying the law enforcement exception, meaning
that the D.C. Circuit was-as in many parts of its opinion-es-
tablishing new precedent. The court summarily declared the
plaintiffs' argument to be "silly," but in fact the plaintiffs were
quite serious.84 A reasonable court could easily hold that TSA
screening operations do not fall under any of the established
categories of Section 1801's exception: law enforcement, correc-
tional, or intelligence activity.
75 H.R. REP. No. 108-504, at 2-3 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3292
(explaining the need for the Video Voyeurism Protection Act).
76 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
77 Id.
78 Id.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1801.
80 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F. 3d at 8.
81 See infra Part IV.F.
82 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
83 The section defines: "capture," "broadcast," "a private area of the individ-
ual," "female breast," and "under circumstances in which that individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." 18 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
84 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
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First, TSA screening operations do not constitute law enforce-
ment activity." The law specifically establishes that screening op-
erations are "carried out by a Federal Government Employee.""
Many court opinions also acknowledge that TSA screening pro-
cedures are not the equivalent of law enforcement activity."
Granted, the text of Section 1801's exception may arguably be
read to reach more broadly than simply encompassing law en-
forcement officers. That is, "law enforcement activity" might
be performed by someone other than a police officer or other
law enforcement agent." But such a reading would be unrea-
sonable because then nearly any government action could be
construed as "law enforcement activity." Put another way, the
fact that a government employee does her job in accordance
with the law does not automatically mean she is engaged in "law
enforcement activity." Under such a broad reading, for exam-
ple, a mailman delivering the mail could be said to be engaged
in "law enforcement activity" because he is enforcing the mail
delivery law 0 by delivering the mail.9 1 Another reason that "law
enforcement activity" cannot be read so broadly as to include
85 Note that the TSA does have an Office of Law Enforcement-it administers
the Federal Air Marshal service. See Office of Law Enforcement, TSA, http://www.tsa.
gov/about-tsa/office-law-enforcement (last updated May 9, 2013). But airport
screening agents, in contrast to Federal Air Marshals, are not federal law enforce-
ment officers.
86 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (a) (2006). "Federal Government Employee" is defined in
5 U.S.C. § 2105; nothing in that definition can be read to include "law enforce-
ment, correctional, or intelligence activity." See id.
87 See, e.g., United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2011) (describ-
ing TSA Operations Direction OD-400-54-2, which requires a TSA screener "to
call a law enforcement officer" to investigate if she finds contraband). It would
not make sense to require a TSA screener to call for a law enforcement officer if
the TSA screener herself was engaged in law enforcement.
88 This relies on the idea that law enforcement activity may be performed by
non-law enforcement officers.
89 But cf Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (noting
that the checkpoint search performed by "uniformed police officers" factored
into the Fourth Amendment analysis because it lessened the intrusion); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (noting that "[s]ecuring the bor-
der and apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities,
and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of
these goals" (emphasis added)).
90 See 39 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
91 Under this reading, almost any federal government employee could be in-
volved in law enforcement activity. As another example, a toll-booth collector
ensures that people follow the toll-related laws before driving on toll roads. In the
same way, airport screeners ensure that people follow carry-on baggage laws
before flying on an airplane.
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any government employee following the law is that such a read-
ing would render the rest of the exception meaningless-that is,
correctional and intelligence activity. The courts give meaning
to each word of a statute.12 Therefore, "law enforcement activ-
ity" should be construed narrowly to include activity engaged in
by law enforcement officers, a statutorily defined group that
does not include TSA screening agents.
Second, TSA airport screening procedures are not "correc-
tional activity." Correctional activity, according to its plain text
meaning," applies to correctional officers and activity taking
place at correctional facilities-e.g., prisons-not airports.
Third, TSA screening operations are not "intelligence activ-
ity."" The Aviation and Transportation Security Act directs the
TSA to act "as the primary liaison for transportation security to
the intelligence and law enforcement communities."15 The TSA
must perform something other than "intelligence and law en-
forcement" activity if the TSA is to be a liaison to the intelli-
gence and law enforcement communities. 6 While the TSA does
maintain its own small Office of Intelligence-in 2006, it in-
cluded about 139 people-airport screeners do not engage in
intelligence activity.97 Airport screeners seek "to deter and physi-
cally prevent terrorists from carrying out a planned attack"; in
92 Eg., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 175 (2001) ("[This Court has the] duty
to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."); see also Murphy
Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 481 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (It is an "'endlessly reiterated principle of statutory construction ... that
all words in a statute are to be assigned meaning, and that nothing therein is to
be construed as surplusage."' (quoting Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139
(D.C. Cir. 1995))).
93 See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) ("When the
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial
inquiry is complete."').
9 But, as noted earlier, the court actually found none of these-it dismissed
the argument as "silly." Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
653 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
95 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) (5) (2006).
96 "Liaison" is defined as "a person who acts as a link to assist communication
or cooperation between groups of people." Definition of Liaison in English, Ox-
FORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ameri-
canenglish/liaison (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
97 Transp. Sec. Admin.'s Office of Intelligence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelli-
gence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of William Gaches, Assistant Adm'r for Intelli-
gence, Transp. Sec. Admin.) ("The intelligence office at TSA is comprised of 99
government personnel and about 40 contractors.").
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contrast, the Office of Intelligence seeks to "stop[ ] terrorists
before they launch an attack."98
There may be a valid argument that airport security opera-
tions are "law enforcement, correctional, or intelligence activ-
ity,"99 as is required for the exception to apply.o But a plain
reading of the law denies the TSA the exception. 0 1
Even if the court could have properly found that TSA screen-
ing is law enforcement or intelligence activity, the court failed in
its duty to draw the required connection between the law and
the facts; the court failed to explain how TSA screening could
fall into the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act's exception. The
court's summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim under the Act
as "silly"102 constituted a complete abandonment of the court's
responsibility to provide insight both to the parties before it and
to similarly situated parties in future cases byjustifying its hold-
ing using sound methods of reasoning. Particularly because no
other court has construed the application or reach of Section
1801(c) in any context-not just the airport security context-
the D.C. Circuit's failure to address the real legal questions val-
idly before it is especially unsettling.
C. PRIVACY ACT
The plaintiffs' next claim against the use of AIT as the pri-
mary screening method was that it violated the Privacy Act of
98 Id.
99 18 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006).
100 For example, the D.C. Circuit might have looked to factors other than case
law, such as legislative history or intent. Maybe the court considered such other
factors but simply omitted them from the opinion. Note that even if such an
argument could be made, the D.C. Circuit did not do so. The court might have
argued that TSA screening operations support intelligence by providing intelli-
gence officers with information relating to the types of threats actually faced at
airport security checkpoints. One flaw of such an argument is the slippery slope
that it quickly leads to. If federal government employees-such as TSA screening
officers-are not subject to Section 1801 (c) because they might provide intelli-
gence officers with useful intelligence, then there is almost no federal govern-
ment employee that does not meet the exception, as doubtless almost any public
position could potentially produce data that is eventually used by an intelligence
officer conducting intelligence work. See note 91, supra, for a similar discussion
of the same slippery slope associated with considering TSA screeners to be en-
gaged in law enforcement activity.
101 As shown in this section, TSA screening activities do not fall under the stat-
utorily defined categories of law enforcement, correctional, or intelligence
activity.
102 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
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1974 (Privacy Act).1o3 The court rejected the Privacy Act claim in
part because the plaintiffs did not offer any reason to believe
that the TSA had in fact combined various sources of informa-
tion and then linked names to the images produced using
AIT.104 But in reality, no plaintiff could ever meet that standard.
"[T]he presumptions for the government and the exceptions
built into the Freedom of Information Act" make it "almost im-
possible for a plaintiff to engage in discovery and successfully
sue a defense agency for a Privacy Act violation." 0 5
Thus, it is possible that the D.C. Circuit had no choice but to
fail to provide any meaningful guidance for future litigants of
Privacy Act claims. Instead, the solution may lie with Congress;
the legislature could revise either the Privacy Act or the Free-
dom of Information Act to allow courts access to the informa-
tion that they and plaintiffs need to determine whether a Privacy
Act violation has actually occurred.'
D. HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
Another statutory claim against the body scanner rollout was
that the Department of Homeland Security's Chief Privacy Of-
ficer failed to discharge her statutory duties to assure that the
use of technologies does not erode privacy protections and to
make an assessment of the rule's impact upon privacy.'07 Con-
gress created the Chief Privacy Officer position to ensure that
Department of Homeland Security activities are conscientious
and protective of privacy.1os One of the Chief Privacy Officer's
responsibilities is to "conduct . .. a privacy impact assessment of
proposed rules of the Department ... on the privacy of personal
information, including the type of personal information col-
lected and the number of people affected." 09
1os Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012)); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 4.
104 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
105 David Gusella, Violating Privacy in Private: How EPIC v. DHS Creates an Impos-
sible Burden on Plaintiffs Trying to Demonstrate a Privacy Act Violation, 53 B.C.L. REv.
E-Supp. 169, 170 (2012). This article does not go into great detail on the court's
flaws with respect to the Privacy Act claim because other scholarly work has al-
ready done so. E.g., id.
106 The Privacy Act cannot protect privacy if the courts do not have access to
the information they need to determine whether a privacy violation has occurred.
107 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8-9.
10 See 6 U.S.C. § 142 (2012).
10- Id. § 142(a) (4).
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The D.C. Circuit's short paragraph about the privacy impact
assessment is illogical and confusing. First, the court infers that
the Chief Privacy Officer's failure to make an assessment was ac-
tually an affirmative determination that her prior efforts to as-
sess the privacy impact of using body scanners generally were
good enough to cover the privacy impact of using body scanners
as the primary screening technology.110 The Chief Privacy Of-
ficer's failure to act, however, is not the same as an affirmative
determination; her failure to act means only that she did not
act. In other words, not making a determination is different
from making a negative determination. The court's logical error
here is relevant precisely because the Chief Privacy Officer had
an affirmative duty to make that very same privacy
determination."'
Second, the court's conclusions regarding the notice-and-
comment proceedings create a further conflict when compared
to its conclusions about the Chief Privacy Officer's privacy assess-
ment. When finding that the TSA should have engaged in a no-
tice-and-comment proceeding before making body scanners the
primary screening method at airports nationwide, the court ex-
plicitly recognized that the expansion of body scanners repre-
sented a distinctly different and potentially problematic privacy
concern.1 1 2 But that creates a conflict within the court's opin-
ion-the court claims that body scanners represent a difference
in kind that requires notice-and-comment proceedings but also
implicitly claims that body scanners do not require a privacy im-
pact analysis because they do not represent a difference in kind
from previous privacy impact assessments.' 1 3
E. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
The D.C. Circuit properly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) for lack
110 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 9.
"1 6 U.S.C. § 142(a) (4).
112 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 6-7 ("The practical question inherent in
the distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations is whether the
new rule effects 'a substantive regulatory change' to the statutory or regulatory
regime. . . . [T] he TSA's policy substantially changes the experience of airline passen-
gers and is therefore not merely 'interpretative' either of the statute directing the
TSA to detect weapons likely to be used by terrorists or of the general regulation
requiring that passengers comply with all TSA screening procedures." (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
M3 Id. at 6-8.
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of standing."' RFRA specifically mandates that general Article
III standing rules govern disputes under RFRA.1 15 The plaintiffs
only asserted that one named party held religious objections to
body scanners, but that party did not have proper standing."'
Therefore, the court dismissed the claim.' 1 7 Because no party
with valid standing was before the court, this was the correct
outcome.
F. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
The plaintiffs' claim with potentially the most import", was
that body scanner technology violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.119 The D.C. Circuit held that body scanner screening does
not violate the Fourth Amendment because of "the measures
taken by the TSA to safeguard personal privacy" and because the
Supreme Court has not held that the reasonableness of a search
under the Fourth Amendment must be measured as "the least
intrusive search practicable. "12o
The D.C. Circuit began by noting that airport security
searches are often analyzed using the administrative-search doc-
114 Id.
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) ("A person whose religious exercise has been
burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or de-
fense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a govern-
ment. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed
by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.").
116 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 9.
117 Id. at 11. Note that even if a party with proper standing were to raise a
religious issue with body scanners, it would be unlikely to succeed. The govern-
ment cannot regulate an individual's approach, practice, or belief in religion. See
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 48-49
(2004) (Thomas,J., concurring) ("[T]he Establishment Clause 'prohibits govern-
ment from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief."' (citing
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989))). But where a compelling
government interest-for example, preventing mass terrorist attacks on the na-
tion's air travel industry-exists, it can outweigh the individual's interest in free
practice of religion. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1;
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963).
118 The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's "sacred" right to privacy.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment protects people."); see alo Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir.
1974) ("The sacredness of a person's ... right of personal privacy and individual-
ity are paramount considerations in our country and are specifically protected by
the Fourth Amendment.").
119 Elec. Pivacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
120 Id.
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trine, which it also claimed to use in this case."'2 The administra-
tive-search analysis includes three factors, as established by the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas.12 2 But the D.C. Circuit ana-
lyzed only two of the factors, ignoring the third to reach its cho-
sen outcome. 2 3
To support its two-factor administrative-search analysis, the
D.C. Circuit relied on inapplicable cases. Rather than use the
rule from United States v. Hartwell2 4-an airport search case ap-
plying the administrative-search exception-the D.C. Circuit in-
stead cited United States v. Knights'12 for the proposition that the
administrative-search balancing test weighs only the search's in-
trusion on privacy against "the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate government interests." 1 2 While it
may raise an eyebrow that Knights is not an airport security
case,1 2 1 further cause for concern arises because Knights is not
even an administrative-search case. In Knights, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a probationary search
supported by reasonable suspicion.'12 But reasonable suspicion
does not exist in the administrative-search context-particularly
not for administrative searches in the airport security context. If
reasonable suspicion were present, the Fourth Amendment
would not mandate a showing of government interest to justify a
search. The reasonable suspicion itself would make the search
reasonable. But in the administrative-search context-e.g., at air-
port security checkpoints-there is no reasonable suspicion, so
the reasonableness test must take into account other factors-
specifically, those laid down in Brown.129
The plaintiffs argued that "using AIT for primary screening
violates the Fourth Amendment because it is more invasive than
121 Id.
122 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
123 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10. Some have argued that because courts
do not correctly apply the administrative-search exception in airport security
cases, a different analytical framework ought to apply. E.g., R. Gregory Israelsen,
Applying the Fourth Amendment's National-Security Exception to Airport Security and the
TSA, 78 J. AIR L. & Com. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that courts should apply
the national-security exception when considering airport security cases).
124 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2006); see infra Part
II.B.
125 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
126 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
127 There are many airport security cases that the court could have referenced
for the rule. E.g., Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178-79.
128 Knights, 534 U.S. at 114.
129 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
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necessary to detect weapons or explosives. "130 In other words,
the plaintiffs claimed that body scanners are too invasive for use
as a primary screening method; if used, scanners ought to only
perform secondary screening as part of an escalating series of
searches. One case that the plaintiffs relied on for this argument
was United States v. Hartwell. 3 1
In Hartwell, the Third Circuit relied on the rule from Brown v.
Texas:13 1 "Suspicionless searches are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment when a court finds a favorable balance be-
tween 'the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.'""3 3
The court in Hartwell then analyzed an airport checkpoint
search-notably pre-AIT-under the three-prong Brown test:
(1) the importance of "preventing terrorist attacks on air-
planes"; (2) whether airport checkpoints "advance the public in-
terest"; and (3) whether "the procedures involved in Hartwell's
search were minimally intrusive."13' Examining the D.C. Cir-
cuit's analysis in light of Brown reveals that the court failed to
adequately address the second factor and completely ignored
the third.
The D.C. Circuit failed to adequately address the second
Brown factor because it did not analyze the effectiveness of AIT
scanners in improving airport security. As the Supreme Court
said in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, a court "must look more
closely at the nature of the public interests."' 3 ' This not only
applies to the first Brown factor-the public's interest in air
safety-but also reasonably applies to the second Brown factor-
whether the procedure in question advances the public
interest.' 3 6
In EPIC, the D.C. Circuit did not analyze the effectiveness of
AIT scanners in improving airport security. The court simply
concluded that "an AIT scanner, unlike a magnetometer, is ca-
pable of detecting, and therefore of deterring, attempts to carry
130 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
131 436 F.3d 174.
132 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
133 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178-79 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427
(2004) (applying the rule from Brown in the highway checkpoint context)).
134 Id. at 179-180.
135 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000).
136 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
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aboard airplanes explosives in liquid or powder form."'3 7 But
the court did not cite or reference any studies, expert opinions,
or objective facts that could support such a conclusion.' 3 The
Hartwell court used a form of the word "effective" in four of its
five sentences discussing the second Brown factor.13 9 By contrast,
the D.C. Circuit in EPIC did not deign to consider the effective-
ness-which may be different than the capability-of body scan-
ners to "detect[ ], and therefore . . . deter[ ], attempts to carry
aboard airplanes explosives in liquid or powder form." 4 0
The D.C. Circuit completely ignored the third Brown factor.
In distinguishing Hartwell's escalating-search approach, the
court implicitly held that the third Brown factor did not apply,
despite the Supreme Court's explicit guidance that all three fac-
tors apply in administrative-search cases."'
Because the D.C. Circuit misconstrued Hartwell's footnote ten,
it avoided applying the third Brown factor.1 4 2 The D.C. Circuit
construed footnote ten to mean that "[n]othing in Hartwell ..
suggests the AIT scanners must be minimally intrusive to be con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment." 4 3
But such a reading cannot logically follow from footnote ten.
The Hartwell court noted, when beginning its analysis of the
third Brown factor, what it was not doing: "set[ting] the outer
limits of intrusiveness in the airport context."'4 4 That is, while
Hartwell's search was minimally intrusive in one way, this does not
mean that other procedures might not also be minimally intru-
sive (and therefore sufficiently unintrusive to meet the Brow-n
standard of "the severity of the interference with individual lib-
erty").145 This reading becomes even more inevitable in view of
137 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
138 This is significant because several researchers and security experts have
questioned the effectiveness of body scanners at discovering explosives. E.g., Body
Scanner Wouldn't Have Foiled Syringe Bomber, Says MP Who Worked on New Machines,
DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1240193/Body-scanner-wouldnt-foiled-syringe-bomber-says-MP-worked-new-ma-
chines.html.
139 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 179-80.
14 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
141 See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 420, 427 (2004) (quoting Brown, 443
U.S. at 51). Ironically, the D.C. Circuit cited Illinois v. Lidster earlier in its Fourth
Amendment analysis. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
142 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 11; Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 n.10.
143 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 11.
44 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 n.10.
145 Brown, 443 U.S. at 41.
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the footnote's second sentence, in which the Hartwell court de-
clined to "devise any bright-line test to implement the Brown
standard in all future cases.""4 6
United States v. Aukai went even further than Hartwell in hold-
ing that a search must be minimally intrusive.1 7 There, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the Fourth Amendment al-
lowed a series of increasingly intrusive search techniques at an
airport security checkpoint.1 4 8 The court said that "[a] particu-
lar airport security screening search is constitutionally reasona-
ble provided that it 'is no more extensive nor intensive than
necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the pres-
ence of weapons or explosives and that it is confined in good
faith to that purpose."" 4 Despite the plain language of the pre-
cedent it cited,15 o the D.C. Circuit held that there is effectively
no limit on the scope of airport searches. 1 5 1
In Hartwell, the Third Circuit spent a significant amount of
time considering the third Brown factor-the level of intrusive-
ness of the search procedure under review. 152 Bcuse the D.C.
Circuit misconstrued Hartwell's footnote ten commentary, the
court did not actually consider how AIT was "minimally intru-
sive."115 The D.C. Circuit simply moved on after expressly re-
jecting the idea that a search ought to be minimally intrusive to
protect privacy.1' An escalating-search procedure-such as the
one approved of in Hartwell-could work well in the AIT scan-
ner context. A passenger who sets off an alarm-whether by
magnetometer, wand, X-ray scan of carry-on baggage, or behav-
ioral analysis-could be pulled aside for additional screening,
which might include an AIT scan or enhanced pat-down. Such
an escalating-search procedure could, as Hartwell pointed out,
"make airport screening procedures minimally intrusive."5 5
146 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 n.10.
147 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 962 (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir.
1973)).
150 Among other cases, Hartwell and Aukai.
151 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) ("Nothing in Hartwell .., suggests the AIT scanners must be minimally
intrusive to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.").
152 See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006).
153 Elec. Privacy Info. Cr., 653 F.3d at 10.
154 Id. ("Nothing in Hartwell ... suggests the AIT scanners must be minimally
intrusive to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.").
155 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180.
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In examining the third Brown factor, the Third Circuit in
Hartwell looked at other factors besides the escalating nature of
the search. Hartwell considered the stigma of being searched,
the potential for abuse, the airlines' interests in protecting pas-
sengers, and the reduction in offensiveness due to notice.' The
D.C. Circuit considered none of these factors, which may also
affect the outcome of a Brown analysis. For example, the public's
visceral reaction to body scanners and enhanced pat-downs may
indicate that there is a significantly greater stigma attached to
such a search than to a traditional magnetometer.1 5 7
AIT also represents an enhanced potential for abuse. Despite
the TSA's claim that it "distort[s] the image created using AIT
and delet[es] it as soon as the passenger has been cleared,"158
there have been multiple reported instances of TSA officers not
following deletion protocol and scanners not being properly
configured.'5 ' The Supreme Court does not trust the govern-
ment to keep its promises to use overbroad grants of power only
within certain bounds.16 0 The TSA's failure to adhere to its own
promised privacy protocols ought to have informed the D.C.
Circuit's decision in its analysis of passenger privacy and AIT
technology.
Regarding the failure to provide notice, the entire point of
the EPIC lawsuit was that the TSA did not hold a notice-and-
comment period before instituting AIT scanners as the primary
screening method nationwide. While the court acknowledged
that the TSA was wrong in failing to do so,'6' it did not analogize
Hartwell to make the connection that such a failure to provide
notice may increase the offensiveness-and therefore intrusive-
ness-of a search.
156 Id.
157 See supra Part I.
158 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
159 Johnson, supra note 3. But cf Bob Burns, TSA Response to "Feds Admit Storing
Checkpoint Body Scan Images", TSA BLOc (Aug. 6, 2010), http://blog.tsa.gov/
2010/08/tsa-response-to-feds-admit-storing.html (pointing out that the U.S. Mar-
shals incident was at a Florida courthouse checkpoint, not an airport, and assert-
ing that airport scanners do not store images).
160 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) ("We would not uphold
an unconstitutional statute merely because the [g]overnment promised to use it
responsibly.").
161 Elec. Pivacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 11.
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The only privacy considerations that the court offered-pre-
sumably coming from the TSA' 62-were red herrings 163:
"[D]istorting the image created using AIT and deleting it as
soon as the passenger has been cleared."164 Pointing out what
the TSA is not doing (i.e., how much worse the privacy intrusion
could be) does not address the real question, which is what the
TSA is doing (i.e., how much the search actually intrudes on
privacy). 6 6 The fact that a government employee deletes an im-
age that some perceive to be similar to an image of an un-
clothed passenger' 6 6 is likely of little comfort to a passenger
leaving a security checkpoint when she considers whether her
privacy has been violated.'16
Another logical failure committed by the D.C. Circuit in sup-
port of its privacy argument was that the passenger could decide
162 Presumably, the court used the privacy considerations raised by the TSA in
its briefs.
163 See Cory S. Clements, Comment, Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumenta-
tion: Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words, 2013 BYU
L. RFv. 319, 349 n.162 (noting that the red herring fallacy "comes from the sport
of fox hunting in which a dried, smoked herring, which is red in color, is dragged
across the trail of the fox to throw the hounds off the scent," and that a "'red
herring' argument ... distracts the audience from the issue in question through
the introduction of some irrelevancy").
164 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
165 That is, the TSA is saying that it could not distort the images and it could
not delete them, and therefore it is protecting privacy by saying that it is not
doing so. But if a person on trial for battery argues that stabbing her victim did
not constitute battery because she did not shoot the victim, that means nothing
with respect to whether she committed battery. Similarly, arguing that AIT scan-
ners distort and do not save images means nothing for the argument as to
whether they actually violate privacy.
166 One rather provocative, well-known image of a woman allegedly created by
inverting a body scan went viral in early 2010. See Adam Frucci, Is It This Easy to
Pull Straight Nude Pics from Airport Scanners? [NSFW], GIzMoDO (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://gizmodo.com/5443901/is-it-this-easy-to-pull-straight-nude-pics-from-air-
port-scanners-[nsfw]. The images turned out to be fake, but the public's wide-
spread reaction indicates that it perceives the TSA's body scanners as presenting
privacy concerns. See also Kashmir Hill, These TSA Porn Photos Would Be Alarming-
If They Were Real, TRUE/SLANT (Jan. 27, 2010), http://trueslant.com/
KashmirHill/2010/01/27/tsa-scanner-porn-hoax-fools-gizmodo-drudge-report/.
167 One writer expressed dismay about officer conduct and body scanners after
learning that some TSA officers were allegedly "laughing and clowning in regard
to some ... nude images." Emma Barker, The TSA Is Laughing at You, COSMOPOLI-
TAN (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/celebrity/news/tsa-laughs-
at-bodies. But cf Bob Burns, Body Scanner Resolution Rooms Conduct & Privacy, TSA
BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013), http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/01/body-scanner-resolution-
rooms-conduct.html (disputing that officers gather in body scanner image-view-
ing rooms).
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how to be violated: "any passenger may opt-out of AIT screening
in favor of a [pat-down], which allows him to decide which of
the two options for detecting a concealed, [non-metallic]
weapon or explosive is least invasive."16 8 But such a Morton's
fork 6 9 is not what the Fourth Amendment intended; for exam-
ple, initial screenings in Hartwell involved "less intrusive substi-
tute[s] for a physical pat-down" and "no physical touching." 7 0
The logical conclusion from reading Hartwell is that a physical
pat-down is even more intrusive-and therefore less likely to
meet the third Brown factor-than another search procedure.
Therefore, an enhanced pat-down-cited approvingly by the
D.C. Circuit-is likely cold comfort to those passengers who
wish to avoid the privacy intrusion of an AIT scan.
The D.C. Circuit's Fourth Amendment analysis of body scan-
ners should not be relied upon by future courts. The court re-
lied on overly attenuated case law to extract the wrong rule for
administrative searches. It then failed to sufficiently analyze the
second Brown factor and incorrectly ignored the third Brown fac-
tor. Because the D.C. Circuit's analysis was so flawed, it should
not be relied on by future courts. This failure to correctly apply
case law or logic is an especially grievous sin because EPIC is
currently the only appellate case to analyze the constitutionality
of body scanners.
G. THE COURT'S FLAWED CONCLUSION
Regardless of the merits of the statutory or constitutional
claims, the court's outcome in light of the notice-and-comment
findings was flawed. The court ordered the TSA to engage in
notice-and-comment proceedings."' After doing so, the D.C.
Circuit cited "the obvious need for the TSA to continue its air-
168 Elec. Pivacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
169 Scott Moise, The Scrivener, 22 S.C. LAw. 44, 45 (2011).
A Morton's Fork is a practical dilemma in which two choices or
alternatives are disadvantageous to or discredit the user. The term
is named for John Morton, the Archbishop of Canterbury and
Henry VII's minister, who used a method of taxing that collected
from everyone based on the following reasoning: the rich could
afford to pay, and the poor must have accumulated savings from
living frugally.
Id.
170 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006).
171 Elec. Pyivacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 11.
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port security operations without interruption" and did not force
the TSA to suspend the rule in the meantime. 17 2
But the court never explained why there was an "obvious
need" for the TSA to continue to use body scanners as an air-
port security measure. 7 3 Of course airports need security mea-
sures, but it does not necessarily follow that those security
measures must include body scanners. This seems particularly
obvious in light of the fact that at the time of the opinion, not
even a year had passed since the TSA began to use body scan-
ners as the primary screening method nationwide.17 1
And if there were an "obvious need" to use body scanners,
then the plaintiffs would not have brought suit. But because
questions surrounding body scanners-particularly their effi-
cacy and safety-remained unanswered, the plaintiffs brought
suit to force a formal public rulemaking process."17 Such a pro-
cess could help the agency and the public understand the issues
surrounding body scanners through a transparent discussion.
The court's claim that the TSA cannot stop using body scan-
ners-even temporarily-is further marred by the simple fact
that the court ordered notice-and-comment proceedings.1 7 1
There are three possible outcomes of notice-and-comment pro-
ceedings: no change to the rule, an amendment of the rule, or a
repeal of the rule.'7 7 Therefore, implicit in the court's order for
the TSA to conduct notice-and-comment proceedings is an ac-
knowledgment that something about the use of body scanners
may need to change. For if there were no possibility for change,
there would be no point to a notice-and-comment proceeding.
Thus, by ordering a notice-and-comment proceeding, the court
implicitly acknowledged that the rule might change.
But the acknowledgment that something about the rule might
change contradicts the court's implicitly claimed "looming spec-
ter of inutterable horror" 78 that would result from the interrup-
tion of the use of body scanners. Because notice-and-comment
proceedings may result in a disruption of the use of body scan-
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 3. In fact, body scanners had not been used for almost the entire
decade following 9/11. See id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 11.
177 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
178 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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ners, it does not make sense for the court to order the TSA to
hold a notice-and-comment proceeding on the use of body scan-
ners and in the same breath claim that the TSA cannot be inter-
rupted in its use of body scanners-precisely because a notice-
and-comment proceeding may result in such a disruption.
V. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit's ruling in EPIC was so flawed that no court
should rely on it as precedent-especially as an issue of first im-
pression. The court's logical errors were legion. Furthermore,
the court relied on overly attenuated case law to arrive at its de-
sired outcome.
The public and future courts have the right to well-reasoned,
logically sound, and precedentially consistent opinions. When
courts fail to produce such opinions, it leaves the public and
future courts in the dark about what the law is and how it ap-
plies. Particularly because many of the substantive issues sur-
rounding. body scanners-including questions about their
constitutionality-have never been considered by any other ap-
pellate court, the D.C. Circuit's epic failure in EPIC is particu-
larly troubling.
As a concluding note, all hope for appellate guidance on body
scanners is not lost. The TSA in early 2013 announced that it
would no longer use backscatter-imaging scanners, opting in-
stead to use only the more privacy-protective millimeter-wave
scanners.' 7 9 A few months later, in April 2013, nearly three years
after the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion with the mandate "to act
promptly on remand to cure the defect" (a lack of notice-and-
comment proceedings) in the rule's promulgation, 180-and
nearly two years after a follow-up order-the TSA initiated no-
tice-and-comment proceedings on body scanners.18 ' The public
finally had the chance to weigh in on the TSA's use of body
scanners.1 2 The agency's final rule is due to issue in June
179 See Nixon, supra note 58, and accompanying text.
180 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8.
181 Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg.
18,287 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013).
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2014.183 That rule may be subject to judicial review, giving the
D.C. Circuit the opportunity to clarify or correct its logical and
reasoning errors in EPIC regarding the substantive statutory and
constitutional questions surrounding the use of body scanners at
airport security checkpoints.
1 Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, FED. REG., http://
www.federalregister.gov/regulations/ 1 652-AA67/passenger-screening-using-ad-
vanced-imaging-technology (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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